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Changes to the Culture of Adversarialness:
Endorsing Candor, Cooperation and Civility
in Relationships Between Prosecutors and
Defense Counsel
by LISSA GRIFFIN and STACY CAPLOW*
Introduction
Relationships between prosecutors and defense counsel are
infamously rocky. Despite the common ground of law school and the
shared experience of practicing in the criminal justice system, these
relationships tend to be riddled with a level of distrust and disrespect
that hardens over time. Rarely do these feelings become unmanage-
able, although a recent assault by a public defender on a prosecutor
suggests that even professionals have their limits.' More typical is the
enduring culture of adversarialness and suspicion that sometimes
seems to justify prosecutorial shortcuts, self-serving interpretations of
procedural rules, and self-justification in the name of obtaining
convictions. On the defense side, lawyers might rationalize their
behavior as nothing more than zealous representation needed to
balance an unequal distribution of power. Most prosecutors and
defense counsel work on opposite sides of the courtroom on a daily
basis, for many years, developing and calcifying these habits.
No doubt many of today's elected and appointed prosecutors try
to set a more professional tone that emphasizes values of fairness and
honesty. But too often the top-down message is diluted by the daily
grind. Some of this antagonistic conduct occurs only between the
* We would like to thank Prof. Bruce A. Green, Chair of the ABA Criminal Justice
Section, for his invitation to participate in this project; Vicki Gannon and Sandra
Spennato (Pace Law School), and Jason Lee (Brooklyn Law School) for their research
support; and to express appreciation for the support of the Pace Law School and Brooklyn
Law School Summer Research Stipends.
1. Cook County Public Defender Charged in Attack on Prosecutor, DAILY HERALD,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 4, 2010, http://67.151.102.46/story/?id=385596.
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lawyers or behind closed office doors. Unless decisions and behavior
surface in the courtroom or other public forum, they are invisible and
thus unregulated, subject only to the self-policing constraints of
training, supervision, individual choice, or office policy. Much of the
criminal justice system takes place in the courtroom, however, so
many interactions between counsel necessarily include judges who
not only preside over the process, but also oversee and mediate the
work of these adversaries in more routine matters, such as scheduling.
These judges are sometimes drawn into the fray as witnesses to or
even victims of intransigent, impolite or argumentative conduct.
When relations between lawyers deteriorate or when legal or ethical
impropriety occurs, judges may be forced to intervene.
For more than thirty years, the Standards have attempted to
constrain these differences and place criminal practice on a relatively
high ethical plateau. The admittedly aspirational Standards, part of
the larger work of the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, serve a
valuable educational and normative function.2 Yet, like any ethical
regulation, they have to be general enough to speak across
jurisdictions and types of criminal practice all over the country while
remaining specific enough to provide some workable guidance.
Despite their lack of direct enforceability, they can be referenced as
guidelines or models for behavior,3 and perhaps even incorporated
into local ethical rules that are enforceable in a particular state.
The most recent effort to revise the Standards is underway,
wending its way through the ABA drafting and approval process. As
of this writing, most of the work has concentrated on the prosecution
function, resulting in several drafts and proposed changes.
Comparably extensive work has not yet taken place on the defense
function, so this article focuses on the more evolved revisions
concerning prosecutors while alluding to some of the parallel
provisions in the proposed revisions to the defense standards that
have been crafted so far.
2. The Standards for the Prosecution and Defense Function must be read in
conjunction with the multivolume ABA Standards for Criminal Justice. Also, the Model
Rules of Professional Responsibility impose specific obligations on prosecutors and
general rules on all attorneys applicable to both prosecutors and defense counsel. See e.g.
MODEL RULE PROF'L CONDUCr R. 4-3.8 (2002) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
3. For example, as of 2009, the Supreme Court had cited the Standards 120 times
and they were cited by the federal circuit courts 700 times. Martin Marcus, The Making of
the ABA Criminal Justice Standards: Forty Years of Excellence, 23 WTR CRIM. JUST. 10
(2009), 11-12.
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One prominent aspect of the Proposed Standards-and the
subject of this article-is a notable shift from an adversarial to a more
cooperative model, emphasizing candor, cooperation, and civility.4
While the existing Standards were never rigidly adversarial, the latest
version offers an even more explicit endorsement of problem-solving,
collegiality, and joint efforts to reform and improve the criminal
justice system. The burden to achieve this goal is not borne evenly, of
course. Their justice mission and greater power to impact the system
obligates prosecutors to move in that direction but now with the
greater involvement of the defense. Some of the proposed revisions
undoubtedly reflect many of the changes in the criminal justice
system that have occurred in recent years so the Proposed Standards
may simply be catching up with the existing momentum toward
cooperation. By introducing these norms into the Proposed
Standards, these revisions articulate a clear endorsement for
continuing movement in that direction.
Following a brief history of prior versions of the relevant
Standards in Part I, Part II describes the current draft of the proposed
Prosecution and Defense Functions, focusing on new requirements
for candor, civility, and cooperation. The article concludes that the
proposed revisions represent a healthy step toward a more reliable,
trustworthy, and efficient criminal justice system. The revisions
explicitly recognize the central, powerful, and multidimensional role
of the prosecutor and attempt to respond accurately and realistically
to the needs and demands of that role. As the drafting and approval
process continues, certain specific areas need greater clarification and
thus should be discussed and contextualized in accompanying
commentary. This would better inform prosecutors and defense
counsel about how the Standards apply to specific circumstances.
I. Prior Versions of the Standards
The first edition of the Standards, published in 1970, barely
referenced relationships between counsel.! In the introduction to the
Prosecution Function section of the original Standards, the drafters
4. Kevin McMunigal argues that neither the adversarial nor cooperative model
prevails, but that most rules of professional conduct "embody compromises between
them." Kevin C. McMunigal, Are Prosecutorial Ethics Standards Different?, 68 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1453, 1458 (2000).
5. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION 9-10 (1st ed. 1970) [hereinafter 1970 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE].
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stated a concern that "the conduct of lawyers involved in the
administration of criminal justice is neither supervised nor disciplined
adequately in this country."' Their goal, therefore, was to provide a
yardstick against which to measure attorney conduct.
Only one rule in this early iteration, Standard 2.8, concerned
relationships of any kind and that was addressed to the relationship
between prosecutors and judges. Standard 2.8 prohibited intentional
misrepresentation of matters of fact or law to the court, urged the
preservation of the reality and appearance of propriety in relations
between prosecutors and judges, and barred unauthorized ex parte
discussions. In addition, this Standard urged the prosecutor to "strive
to avoid the appearance as well as the reality of any relationship
which would tend to cast doubt on the independence and integrity of
his office."' Although the Standard itself did not indicate the
situations to which this applied, the commentary reveals that the
principal concern behind this admonition was the fear that defense
counsel might engage in conduct that could imply to potential clients
that the attorney had influence with the prosecution. While hardly an
insignificant concern, this singular focus today seems archaic and
limited. The commentary generously observed that the "prosecutor
need not avoid friendly contacts with fellow lawyers on the opposing
side in criminal cases and participation in the social and professional
activities of bar groups."'
This narrow set of concerns clearly reflects their historical
context. By 1970, prosecutors had begun recognizing the value of
professionalization and repudiating political influences. The Supreme
Court increasingly addressed the scope of prosecutorial authority,
sometimes imposing constraints on the behavior of prosecutors, in
addition to the police, in areas such as disclosure of evidence,9 speedy
trial,o and jury selection." At the same time, courts were increasingly
deferential to the discretion of the prosecutor in other areas, such as
charging. 2 Given the need to create standards addressed to specific
conduct responsive to the more pressing developments emerging
6. Id. at 23.
7. Id.; Commentary to 1970 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra, note
5, § 2.8.
8. 1970 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 5.
9. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
10. See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
11. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
12. See, e.g., Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987).
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from doctrine and practice, "soft" relationship-focused standards
took a back seat. It is not even clear from the introductory materials
in the first edition that any need for such general behavioral
standards was acknowledged.
The current version of the Standards, published in 1993," focused
primarily on the bilateral relationship between prosecutors and the
courts and did not noticeably depart from its predecessor. The key
sections and their corresponding commentary were largely unchanged
with respect to the critical aspects of deliberate misrepresentation, the
reality and appearance of impartiality in relations with judges, and
the ban on unauthorized ex parte contacts. This version added a
command that the prosecutor disclose adverse authority in the
controlling jurisdiction, a provision already found in the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules").14
Two sections of the 1993 version, Standards 3-1.2: The Function
of the Prosecutor, and Standard 3-2.8: Relations with the Court and
Bar, speak to the role and general behavior of the prosecutor. The
language of Standard 3-1.2 tracks its counterpart in the 1970 version,
Standard 1.1, almost verbatim. Prosecutors continue as
administrators of justice, advocates, and officers of the court
empowered to exercise sound discretion who must seek justice not
merely convict. There were two notable changes, however. First, the
1993 version added to the function of the prosecutor the
responsibility to "reform and improve the administration of criminal
justice and to stimulate efforts for remedial action when confronted
by injustices in substantive or procedural law."'" The second change
is a major deletion. The original Standards provided that the
standards could be used as a basis for disciplinary sanctions against a
prosecutor engaged in "unprofessional conduct" according to other
subsections." This provision was deleted in the 1993 version in which
13. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND
DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter 1993 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE].
14. MODEL RULES, supra note 2, at R. 3.3(a)(3).
15. Id., 1993 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 13, § 3-1.2(d).
This language had appeared in another section of the Second edition of the Standards, but
was moved here in the Third. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3-1.4 (2d ed. 1980).
16. For example, Standard § 2.8 states, "It is 'unprofessional conduct' for a prosecutor
intentionally to misrepresent fact or law to the court." 1970 ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 5, § 2.8. Under former Standard 2.2, that misconduct
could be subject to sanction. Id. § 2.2.
849
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the standards are transformed into simply a "guide to professional
conduct and performance" rather than "criteria for judicial evaluation
of alleged misconduct of the prosecutor" and are silent with respect
*17to disciplinary actions.
By 1993, Standard 3-2.8, governing relations with the courts and
bar, also did not noticeably modify its predecessor. The key sections
and their corresponding commentary were largely unchanged with
respect to the critical aspects of candor, the reality and appearance of
impartiality in relations with judges, and the ban on unauthorized ex
parte contacts with judges. This edition added a command that the
prosecutor disclose adverse authority in the controlling jurisdiction, a
provision already found in the Model Rules."
II. The Proposed Revisions
A. The Role of the Prosecutor
As noted above, commands and constraints relating to
professional roles and relationships between lawyers and the courts
are, in effect, meta-standards that should influence and pertain to all
of the other Standards. Proposed Standard 3-1.2 is such a standard,
setting forth a considerably expanded vision of the role of the
prosecutor. The 1993 Standards describe the prosecutor as "an
administrator of justice, an advocate and an officer of the court," and
require that the prosecutor use "sound discretion," "seek justice,"
and "reform and improve the administration of criminal justice."l9
The Proposed Standard describes the prosecutor with more nuance
and complexity as:
* An administrator of justice
* An advocate
* An officer of the court
* A seeker of justice
* A servant of both justice and the public interest
* A problem-solver, not merely an advocate
* A community relations assistant
* A reformer of the criminal justice system
17. 1993 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,supra note 13, § 3-1.1.
18. MODEL RULES, supra note 2, at R. 3.3(a)(3).
19. 1993 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 13, § 3-1.2.
[Vol. 38:4850
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* An ethical lawyer 0
The much more diverse and elaborate descriptions and directives
about the prosecutor's duties inform and shape the entire document.
The revision certainly stacks many longstanding and some new
responsibilities on the plate of the prosecutor. While the admonition
to understand the job as meaning more than just a mandate to convict
had been voiced for a long time, this list makes that duty more
concrete and discernable. Of course, in carrying out all of these high
principles and grave duties, the prosecutor still has enormous
discretion and great advantages of power, information and resources,
yet only professional pride, self-respect, and an internal moral
compass can truly induce compliance.
The newly articulated dimensions of the prosecutorial role
undoubtedly recognize some significant recent changes to the modern
office. Prosecutors have been part of the well-established movement
toward "problem-solving courts" and their more nuanced approach to
crime prevention and law enforcement.2 1 Community courts and
specialized courts dealing with narcotics, prostitution, domestic
violence, and mental hygiene, for example, are an increasingly
popular option and could not be effectuated without prosecutorial
cooperation. While these reforms are not without critics, often
coming from the defense perspective,22 they do represent efforts to
address the problem of crime by looking at root problems and causes
rather than simply obtaining convictions. The recognition of the
prosecutor as "problem solver" certainly dovetails with the
prosecutor's role in solving the problems of crime, not just
prosecuting.
A second meta-section of the Proposed Standards is section 3-
3.3, entitled "Relationships with the Court and Counsel." Like
20. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.2
(Proposed Revisions 2010) [hereinafter PROPOSED PROSECUTION STANDARDS]; Rory K.
Little, The ABA's Project to Revise the Prosecution and Defense Function Standards, 62
HASTINGS L.J. 1113 (Appendix: ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Proposed Revisions
to Standards for the Prosecution Function) (2011) [hereinafter Little, App.: Proposed
Prosecution Standards].
21. For a discussion of the creation and evolution of these courts, see, e.g., Symposium
Panel, Problem Solving Courts: A Conversation with the Experts, 10 U. MD. LAw J. RACE,
RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 137 (2010); Tom Perrotta, As Specialized Courts Come of
Age, Experts Extol Benefits but See Pitfalls, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 15, 2005, at 1.
22. See, e.g., id.; Robert V. Wolf, Race, Bias, and Problem-Solving Courts, 21 NAT'L
BLACK L.J. 27 (2009); Eric. J. Miller, Drugs, Courts, and the New Penology, 20 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 417 (2009).
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Proposed Standard 3-1.2, this Standard applies generally to all stages
of a case and any interactions with judges or defense attorneys.
While the proposed section restates some venerable principles, it also
expresses some new values, particularly with respect to general
relations with defense counsel. This section seems to be the "how-to"
execute the "must-dos" of other prosecutorial functions. Its language
and message suggest that the "gladiatorial" model of litigation is
ameliorated by the special role of the prosecutor. While there are
many similarities between the current and the Proposed Standard,
this paper will spotlight the differences that change both its overall
spirit and emphasis, as well as some details.
Following a summary of the revisions, we will discuss the major
changes in more detail.
Proposed Standard 3-3.3 begins with a new caution about the
duty not to "knowingly" make a false statement of fact or law, or
offer false evidence not only to a judge, but also, for the first time, to
a "lawyer or third party."24  This introductory sentence expresses
explicitly a prosecutor's responsibility to truth to all concerned
parties, not just the court.25
23. Proposed Standard 3-3.3 supplements other parts of the proposed Standards with
respect to several important ethical issues that are specifically addressed elsewhere:
presentation of false evidence, PROPOSED PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 20, § 3-
6.6(b); correction of false evidence by disclosure or otherwise, § 3-7.6(d); timely disclosure
of evidence; Id. § 3-5.5(c); conduct during plea discussions, Id. § 3-5.7(d); and professional
courtroom conduct, Id. § 3-6.2. As such, this Standard, and any discussion of it, does not
draw upon "hard law" generated by cases, ethical rulings, or legislation. It is a "soft"
standard that is aspirational, and perhaps inspirational. Also, like all other Standards, it
lacks an independent enforcement mechanism unless the transgression involves a legal or
ethical rule that otherwise would be remediable or sanctionable in either a court or
disciplinary proceeding. Nevertheless, its normative message raises the bar quite a bit for
prosecutorial forthrightness and thus a more open and trustworthy process. Little, App.:
Proposed Prosecution Standards, supra note 20.
24. PROPOSED PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 20, § 3-3.3; Little, App.:
Proposed Prosecution Standards, supra note 20.
25. Id. There has been some effort on the part of the drafters of the revised
Standards to extend this duty even further and to give it more depth. In a revision that
apparently has not gained traction, a separate proposed Standard 3-1.3 sets forth a
"Special Duty of Candor" which likely must be read in conjunction with 3-3.3 since it
moves much of the text of the 1993 standard it seems to revise. See 1993 ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 13, § 3-2.8. This revision posits that the
prosecutor should "err on the side of candor." Section 3-1.3 denominates the prosecutor's
duties as "special," i.e., beyond those of other lawyers, and cautions that a prosecutor
should "err on the side of candor." PROPOSED PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note
20, § 3-1.3. Little, App.: Proposed Prosecution Standards, supra note 20. Prosecutors
might chafe at the idea that their duty of candor exceeds that owed by other lawyers. For
[Vol. 38:4852
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The prosecutor not only is cautioned to both refrain from making
false statements to the court, defense counsel, and others, but also to
"correct any material false statement" when its falsity comes to light.26
This tracks ABA Model Rule 3.3(3). Next, the Proposed Standard
recognizes a prosecutor's responsibility to assist the court in reaching
correct and fair results in two ways: first, in its substantive legal
decisions, by requiring that prosecutors explicitly discuss directly
contrary authority, and, second, in resolving scheduling, ethical and
administrative matters that impact on the fairness of an individual
case or of the criminal justice process generally.27 The prosecutor is
urged to maintain both the appearance and reality of professional
conduct particularly with respect to ex parte conversations with a
judge relating to a pending case.
Finally, with respect to the prosecutor's relationship with both
the court and defense counsel, Proposed Standard 3-3.3 prescribes a
new obligation "with regard to generalized matters requiring judicial
discussion (for example, case management or administrative
matters)," that would require a prosecutor to "invite a representative
defense counsel" to join the discussion "to the extent practicable." 28
Similarly, the revision prescribes a more collegial, cooperative, and
collaborative relationship in resolving "ethical, scheduling, and other
issues that may arise in particular cases or generally in the criminal
justice system." The corresponding 1993 version urged merely a
general effort at cooperation, and only with respect to resolving
ethical problems.
The Proposed Standard delivers a message about the day-to-day
relationships of the prosecutor to the court and opposing counsel that
suggests a new, more open collaborative approach, particularly when
read in conjunction with the problem-solving, reformer role
contained in 3-1.2. This may not be very controversial in many places
where efforts at problem-solving courts, law enforcement initiatives,
or rule revisions have increasingly involved stakeholders from many
communities, including the defense. But, the official ABA blessing
that reason, perhaps this section is very tentative since these specific provisions were not
part of the Task Force draft and ultimately may not be included in the final version.
26. PROPOSED PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 20, § 3-3.3. Little, App.:
Proposed Prosecution Standards, supra note 20.
27. PROPOSED PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 20, § 3-3.3. Little, App.:
Proposed Prosecution Standards, supra note 20.
28. PROPOSED PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 20, § 3-3.3. Little, App.:
Proposed Prosecution Standards, supra note 20.
853
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undoubtedly will have an impact on prosecutors who are less open to
these kinds of initiatives.
By endorsing a responsibility to avoid misrepresentations of fact
or law, (possibly) to enhance that responsibility by correcting
misstatements, the Proposed Standards appear to recognize a
paramount systemic interest in promoting truth and reliable
outcomes. The next sections examine the new language in some
detail.
1. Duty of Candor beyond the Tribunal
A lawyer's general duty of candor is articulated in the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3, which requires candor
toward the tribunal.29 The Model Rule strikingly omits extending this
duty to anyone else, including opposing counsel. Proposed Standard
3-3.3(a) takes a major step beyond the current Model Rule and the
current Standard to extend the duty of candor to relationships with
other "lawyers or third parties" in all contexts, with the exception of
false statements that might be part of an investigation. Presumably,
this enhanced duty of candor reflects the different role played by the
prosecutor and the fact that a prosecutor's lack of candor may cause
unjust punishment or discredit the integrity of the criminal justice
system.30 Courts have long recognized that the prosecution's duty "is
not that it shall win a case but that justice shall be done."31 In
investigating and prosecuting crime, prosecutors do a unique kind of
work and have unique and in some areas constitutionally required,
obligations. The prosecutor does not have an individual client and
represents the government-with a full range of objectives that
private clients do not have: fairness, justice, accuracy, deterrence.
Normative expectations for prosecutors are different, and summed up
in the requirement that they "do justice."
29. PROPOSED PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 20, § 3-3.3. Little, App.:
Proposed Prosecution Standards, supra note 20. Section 3-6.8(a) mandates candor
specifically in the context of plea negotiations, albeit in slightly different terms. ("A
prosecutor should deal honestly, reasonably, and in good faith with defense counsel in
plea discussions . . ."J. PROPOSED PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 20, § 3-6.8;
Little, App.: Proposed Prosecution Standards, supra note 20.
30. See generally, Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV.
1573, 1576-78 (2003); Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J.
LEG. ETHICS 309, 311-13 (2001); Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek
Justice"? 26 FORDHAM U. L.J. 607, 615-16 (1999).
31. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
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2. Duty Not to Make False Statements or Knowingly Offer False
Evidence
Current Standard 3-2.8(a) states that, "[a] prosecutor should not
intentionally misrepresent matters of fact or law to the court."3 2 The
Proposed Standard prohibits "knowing" misrepresentation.33 As
defined by the Model Rules, "knowledge" means actual knowledge,
but, as is usually the case, actual knowledge can be inferred from the
circumstances.' The change in language to prohibit false statements
made "knowingly" can be viewed as an improvement over the prior
standard for several reasons. From an ethical perspective, given a
prosecutor's virtual monopoly over the facts and tremendous power,
making a statement that a prosecutor knows is false is a violation of
the proper role of the prosecutor, whether intentional or not. Indeed,
intentionally making false statements or presenting false evidence
that prejudices a defendant are already prohibited by the Due Process
Clause.35 Moreover, it is extremely difficult to prove intent, and, in
this context, there is not much difference between knowingly making
a false statement and intentionally making one: if a prosecutor knows
a statement is false, and makes it, he or she is most likely making it
intentionally. Finally, since the "knowing" standard governs the
obligations of all lawyers,3 it would be improper to impose a less
demanding standard of candor on prosecutors, who have no client
loyalties and have a supervening obligation to do justice. The
Proposed Standard now conforms to the profession-wide scienter
requirement.
Some of the revision drafters would have increased the duty
prohibiting statements of fact or law to proscribe the making of
statements where the prosecutor "reasonably believes" they are
untrue.3 1 "Reasonably believes," as defined in the Model Rules,
means the lawyer believes the fact in question and under the
circumstances that belief is reasonable. It does not require actual
knowledge of falsity, however. Such a scienter standard would create
32. 1993 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 13, § 3-2.8(a).
33. PROPOSED PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 20, § 3-2.8. Little, App.:
Proposed Prosecution Standards, supra note 20.
34. MODEL RULES, supra note 2, at R. 1.0(f).
35. Mooney v. Hollohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
36. Id.; MODEL RULES, supra note 2, at R. 3.3.
37. A parenthetical to revised Standard 3-3.3 indicates that the Standards Committee
has not reviewed this issue yet.
38. MODEL RULES, supra note 2, at R. 1.0(i).
855
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a much broader range of unethical behavior than either the Model
Rules or the Proposed Standards. Circumstances may exist where a
prosecutor did not actually know a statement was false, but where,
under the circumstances, whether because of its source, lack of
corroboration, or inherent unreliability, a prosecutor might
reasonably believe a statement is untrue. Under the broader
suggested Standard, offering the statement would be unethical.
Given the prosecutor's unique power and quasi-judicial status, it can
be argued that the Proposed Standards should require the higher
duty.
A few examples might illustrate this difference:
A defendant is charged with murder. The prosecutor tells
defense counsel, "We recovered a gun and the ballistics
evidence shows it's the murder weapon." In fact, the ballistics
evidence is consistent with the weapon being the murder
weapon, but the weapon is fairly common and the testing does
not exclude a large range of other weapons. The prosecutor
knows from his expert that using the phrase "consistent with"
may be misleading. Defendant was not arrested at the scene of
the murder, and there is no other evidence that connects the
defendant with the murder weapon. It turns out that the gun is
not the murder weapon.
One of the prosecutor's witnesses has several pending criminal
charges. To avoid having a negative impact on the witness's
credibility, the prosecutor has refused to make any explicit deal
with the witness for leniency. However, the prosecutor believes
that the witness expects some benefit from his testimony and
that he will probably get some benefit. The prosecutor instructs
the witness before trial as follows: When asked on cross-
examination if he has made any deals with the prosecution, the
witness should answer "No."
If the Proposed Standard required only a "reasonable belief,"
would that change the result? Assuming that the prosecutor believes
the gun is the murder weapon, if there is no other evidence to connect
the weapon to the murder that belief could be unreasonable, in which
case the prosecutor probably has violated the suggested Standard.
Similarly, since the prosecutor believes the witness expects a benefit,
and that belief is reasonable, the witness preparation would violate
the suggested Standard. As long as the Proposed Standard requires
actual knowledge of a misstatement of fact, even if a prosecutor has
[Vol. 38:4856
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reason to believe a statement is false, the prosecutor can continue to
represent it as true and can rely on it.
With this outcome, the shift to a duty of candor based on
subjective knowledge does not represent a particularly significant
change; nor does it require more diligence from a prosecutor to
ascertain the truth. The stricter standard for prosecutors that would
require disclosure or correction without actual knowledge of falsity
might create an incentive for prosecutors to be more cautious about
relying on uncorroborated but otherwise seemingly reliable
information.39 On the other hand, as a quasi-judicial officer with a
duty to do justice, a prosecutor should not make a factual assertion
that she disbelieves or mislead about the strength of her belief.
Finally, should there be a discussion in the Proposed Standard or
its commentary about the prosecutor's obligation to investigate or
corroborate information? Can the prosecutor be accountable for
willful blindness? What if this ignorance is the product of negligence?
Do the special duties of a prosecutor to seek justice necessitate a
higher duty of care? If so, should the degree or level of the duty of
care differ depending on the kind of evidence at issue? If the
proposed revision remains the same, the drafters will need to answer
these important questions in commentary.
3. Duty to Correct Material False Statements
The current Standard does not reference a remedial obligation at
all. Since 2002, however, Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) has imposed a duty on
all lawyers to take "reasonable remedial measures" when they later
become aware of a false statement. But the Model Rule is limited to
false statements made to a tribunal. Proposed Standard 3-3.3 follows
and increases this responsibility.
The Proposed Standard differs from the Model Rule in two
respects. First, it requires correction of material false statements
made to others in addition to the court, presumably including defense
counsel, witnesses, defendants, and other third parties." Second, it
requires actual correction, not merely reasonable remedial measures.
39. See generally Fred C. Zacharias and Bruce A. Green, The Duty to Avoid
Wrongful Convictions: A Thought Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors, 89 B. U. L.
REV. 1 (2009).
40. "A prosecutor should correct a representation of material fact or law that the
prosecutors knows is, or later learns was, false, and should disclose a material fact or facts
when necessary to avoid assisting a fraudulent or criminal act or to avoid misleading a
judge or factfinder." PROPOSED PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 20, § 3-3.3(a).
Little, App.: Proposed Prosecution Standards, supra note 20.
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This difference can be explained by the special role of the prosecutor
who has no client confidences to protect. The prosecutor should
(meaning must) correct, not merely make a good faith effort.
The second duty set forth in the Proposed Standard but not in
the current Standard requires disclosure of "a material fact .. . when
necessary to avoid assisting a fraudulent or criminal act." 4' This duty
applies to all lawyers under ABA Model Rule 4.1(b), except that the
prosecutor is not constrained by client confidentiality.
Essentially, any analysis of the new duty to correct false
statements focuses on the issue of materiality. A precise
understanding of this term is elusive and largely contextual.
Webster's Dictionary defines "material" as "having real importance or
great consequences." 42 Black's Law Dictionary says "material" means
that knowledge of the fact "would affect a person's decision-making;
significant; essential." 43 The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 538
instructs that a matter is material if:
(a) A reasonable man would attach importance to its existence
or nonexistence in determining his choice of action; or (b) the
maker of the representation knows or has reason to know that
its recipient regards or is likely to regard the matter as
important in determining his choice of action, although a
reasonable man would not so regard it."
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not define "material," but they do
require that, to be relevant, evidence must relate to a fact that is "of
consequence to the determination." 45 This is probably the broadest
prevailing definition of the term "material."
Where a conviction for false testimony before a grand jury
requires the testimony to be "material," that term is defined broadly
to include testimony that "has the natural effect or tendency to
impede, influence or dissuade [the grand jury from pursuing its
investigation]."" In the context of determining the prejudicial value
of false testimony in criminal cases, a falsehood is material only if
41. PROPOSED PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 20, § 3-3.3(a). Little, App.:
Proposed Prosecution Standards, supra note 20.
42. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 709 (1974).
43. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (1977).
45. FED. R. EVID. 401.
46. People v. Davis, 53 N.Y.2d 164, 171 (1981), quoting United States v. Stone, 439
F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1970).
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correcting it creates a reasonable probability of a different result or
plea.47 That would be the narrowest interpretation. Under the Model
Rules, the term has been interpreted more broadly to include any
statement that would or could have "influenced the decision-making
process significantly."'
The following examples expose the challenge of this
requirement:
A defendant is charged with robbery. The prosecutor
announces ready for trial and tells defense counsel that his
complaining witness, a drug addict, is drug free, is ready to
testify, and will offer credible and convincing testimony. Just
before trial, the prosecutor learns that the witness 1) has
recently been arrested on a drug charge; or 2) has recently been
admitted to residential drug treatment facility; or 3) cannot be
located. The defendant and his lawyer must decide whether to
accept a plea or go to trial.
As above, one of the prosecutor's witnesses has several pending
criminal charges. To avoid having a negative impact on the
witness's credibility, the prosecutor has refused to make any
explicit deal with the witness for leniency. However, the
prosecutor believes that the witness expects some benefit from
his testimony and that he will probably get some benefit. The
prosecutor instructs the witness before trial as follows: When
asked on cross-examination if he has made any deals with the
prosecution, the witness should answer "No." When asked if he
expects any benefit from his testimony, the witness should
answer, "Yes, I hope to receive a benefit." Instead, at trial, the
witness answers the latter question by stating, "No."
In the first hypothetical, the fact that the witness has been
arrested may not be material because it is only an arrest. On the
other hand, the availability and impeachability of the witness may be
important to the defendant's decision on how to proceed. The same
arguments can be made about the fact that the witness is in residential
treatment, only stronger. The fact that she cannot be located may be
most material of all in the defendant's calculus about how to proceed
and in developing trial strategy. The second hypothetical presents a
situation where there is a false statement that clearly is material to the
47. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
48. In re Conduct of Merkel, 138 P.3d 847, 850 (Or. 2006) (per curiam), citing In re
Gustafson, 968 P.2d 367, 375 (Or. 1998) (per curiam).
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witness's credibility. The prosecutor certainly "reasonably believes"
the statement is false and, under the circumstances, also "knows" it is
false. Accordingly, the prosecutor would have a duty to correct this
evidence because it is "necessary to avoid misleading [the]
factfinder." Presumably, that correction could be done explicitly or
on further redirect examination.
Issues of timing and duration are entirely omitted from the
revision. When should a prosecutor correct a false statement?
Obviously, a delay in correcting could have a substantial impact on a
defendant's decision whether to go to trial, or on defense counsel's
strategy at trial. There would appear to be little legitimate reason for
a prosecutor to delay correcting a material false statement other than
to gain a tactical advantage. On the other hand, there will be times
when a prosecutor does not learn of the falsity of a statement or
evidence until long after the statement has been made or does not
realize it until he or she begins to prepare for trial. This indefiniteness
is a weakness in the Proposed Standard.
Various possibilities present themselves. The Proposed Standard
could require correction "immediately," "upon discovery of the
falsehood," "as soon as reasonably possible" or "as soon as
practicable," "before entry of a plea or trial" or "in time for use at
trial." Any of these time frames would provide more guidance than
the current version. This is similar to the standard used by the courts
in the context of delays in disclosing exculpatory material, where
delay is reversible if the material is not received in time to allow
defense counsel to use the information to prepare and present the
defense case.49 Another alternative would be to have different time
periods depending on when the falsity is recognized: pre-trial, during
trial, at time of sentencing, post-trial proceedings, or even long after
the final judgment.
Similarly, how long does the obligation to correct exist? Model
Rule 3.8(g) addresses the prosecutor's post-conviction obligation to
correct if there is newly discovered evidence of innocence. Does the
obligation to correct here end with a verdict or continue post-
conviction? If it continues, how is materiality judged once the
defendant is convicted and sentenced?
Finally, the revision does not say how correction should be
accomplished. Under the Model Rules, correction is accomplished if
49. See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 244 n.1 (2d ed.
2006) (collecting cases).
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an attorney takes "reasonable remedial measures," including
disclosure to the court." It may be sufficient to disavow a statement
("We no longer rely on. . . ."). Alternatively, the duty to "correct"
would appear to require that the true facts be revealed. To whom is
the correction made? The Proposed Standard seems to assume the
correction will be made directly to the recipient of the false
statement. Should the prosecutor be given some other acceptable
method of correction, for example, informing the court? Should the
method of correction be explicit to help prosecutors do the right
thing, and to make it more difficult to side-step the duty? Again, the
Proposed Standards fail to provide much guidance; commentary
would be very helpful here.
4. Duty to Reveal Contrary Authority
The obligation of candor applies to law as well as fact. Included
in the prosecutor's duty not to make false statements of law is the
explicit obligation to disclose contrary legal authority to the court.
Most prosecutors' offices have appellate departments where the
lawyers are fully aware of the law and their ethical obligations in
relation to it. These appellate lawyers rarely violate this rule. The
real impact of this rule may be on trial level prosecutors who are
often pressed for time and may feel they are unable to do
comprehensive research. They may also have less familiarity with the
ethical rule.
Under the current Standard, and under Model Rule 3.3(a)(2),
the prosecutor (like all lawyers) has an obligation to disclose only
controlling authority that the prosecutor knows to be directly adverse
to his or her legal position. The prosecutor may thus claim that he or
she did not disclose adverse authority because, in the opinion of the
prosecutor, it was not directly adverse. Under the Proposed
Standard, however, the prosecutor has a duty to disclose any contrary
authority that is in fact directly adverse to the prosecutor's position of
which he is aware. The determination of the impact of the controlling
authority is no longer up to the prosecutor but is objective.
This approach would seem to be more consistent with a
longstanding ABA ethics opinion which establishes that disclosure of
adverse authority is required if "the decision which opposing counsel
has overlooked is one which the court should clearly consider in
50. MODEL RULES, supra note 2, at R. 3.3(a)(3).
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deciding the case."" However, under the revision, a prosecutor-
unlike other lawyers-may avoid violating the Proposed Standard by
proving s/he was "unaware" of the authority. This seems to
contradict the intent to impose a special ethical obligation on
prosecutors insofar as it grants them a special exemption from staying
current with the law or conducting reliable legal research. By
requiring actual awareness, therefore, the Proposed Standard
weakens this responsibility by allowing the prosecutor to claim
ignorance of legal authority.
In addition, the Proposed Standard appears to require
prosecutors to assist the court by not simply citing directly contrary
authority but also by describing it. Presumably, this change would 1)
prohibit the hiding of directly contrary authority by citing it in a way
that it is difficult to notice, e.g., in a footnote or string cite; and 2)
would require that the prosecutor actually discuss any directly
contrary authority.
The obligation to disclose adverse authority extends to all
lawyers." In light of their justice mission, the duty takes on a
somewhat different form for prosecutors who have no client loyalty
interest to preserve. The prosecutor has the more neutral job of
making sure that the judge does not make mistakes in applying the
law. It could be argued that prosecutors thus should be less
adversarial when it comes to legal argument and must fully disclose
and discuss the law regardless of how it affects the case. In addition,
because of the central role they play in the administration of justice, it
is arguable that prosecutors have an even higher obligation to assist
the court in fully understanding the state of the law and the
significance of precedent. The following examples call for an
application of the Proposed Standard:
At trial, and after a brief recess to permit the parties to
formulate their arguments, a prosecutor argues a relatively
unique issue of law but fails to cite a case from the highest
appeals court that is directly contrary to his case. He claims he
did not know about the case since it was recently decided.
The defense is appealing the denial of a motion to suppress
evidence. The argument is based on U.S. Supreme Court
authority. The prosecutor knows that the highest-level appellate
51. ABA Comm. on Prof'1 Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 280 (1949).
52. MODEL RULES, supra note 2, at R. 3.3(3).
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court has issued decisions more favorable to the defense
position by relying on the New York State Constitution. The
defense attorney has not cited this authority.
In the first hypothetical, the prosecutor does not know the
directly contrary authority, so he has not violated the revision.
However, he should have known about a precedent from the highest
court. The new formulation of the rule, therefore, might excuse
lawyers who are too busy or too lazy to find directly contrary
authority. It may also encourage lawyers to be uneducated about
precedent or to otherwise avoid "knowing" about directly contrary
authority. On the other hand, it might have the salutary effect of
forcing more prosecutors to fully research an issue and, if there is
directly contrary authority, to consider alternative dispositions or
arguments. This, in turn, might expedite the criminal process if the
prosecutor, realizing that the law contradicts his or her legal position,
were to change an argument or position, concede a point, or even
dismiss a case.
In the second hypothetical, the prosecutor knows about direct
controlling authority, but defense counsel has not cited it. While the
authority qualifies under the Proposed Standard, there is an argument
that the cases are not really "contrary" because the argument has
been waived. In the parenthetical variation, the contradictory case is
decided in a court that is not a controlling authority over the trial
court in which the case is pending. The language in the revision
"legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction" might provide a
loophole for the prosecutor inclined to read the Proposed Standard
narrowly.
B. The Prosecutor's Relationship with the Court
1. Nature and Appearance of the Relationship
The frequently close quarters of criminal practice creates
temptations to engage in casual conversation, allude to shared
experiences, or otherwise relax formalities. Whatever the motivation,
both the current and Proposed Standard impose a responsibility on
prosecutors to observe proprieties in their relationships with judges,
even if doing so requires behavior that is stiff or unnatural.
Minor language changes have been made with respect to the
prosecutor's duty to preserve the appearance of proper relationships
with the court. A prosecutor no longer needs to "carefully" strive to
preserve a proper appearance, but now need only "strive," a small but
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significant diminishment of the quality of effort required. The
appropriate relationship also has been changed from "the correct
relationship which professional traditions, ethical codes, and
applicable law require between advocates and judges," to a vaguer
guideline of a "proper and professional" relationship." These
changes appear to simplify the description of an appropriate arm's
length relationship and the prosecutor's obligation to maintain it by
being general enough to include a lot of different kinds of
interactions. Also, and consistent with other parts of the revision, the
changes could be interpreted to suggest a less tradition bound and
more flexible relationship needed to respond effectively to the
demands of the practice.
A judge was formerly an assistant in the office in which the
prosecutor works. At trial, but outside the hearing of the jury,
the judge continually calls the prosecutor by his first name and
refers to "when I worked in the DA's office. .. ". In the jury's
presence, the judge is cordial and patient with the prosecutor,
but is inflexible and impatient with defense counsel, whom he
repeatedly accuses of unnecessary delay.
During the intervals between cases on the calendar, the judge
calls the prosecutor to the bench in front of spectators, defense
attorneys and others in the audience. With the prosecutor's
back to the courtroom, the judge is asking the prosecutor
administrative questions about the pending calendar off the
record. The judge's questions have nothing to do with a
particular matter but neither the defense nor the audience have
any way of knowing this.
The first hypothetical reflects a reality of criminal practice: many
judges have previously served as prosecutors, many in the same
jurisdiction in which they sit. Some judges are part-time lawyers in
the community. This relationship may or may not impact the fairness
of the judge's rulings, but frequently it creates an appearance of
impropriety and favoritism. Sometimes the appearance is only
noticed by the defendant and defense counsel; sometimes it extends
to a witness or spectator. In the most serious situations, the
interactions are apparent to the jury.
53. PROPOSED PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 20, § 3-3.3(b). Little, App.:
Proposed Prosecution Standards, supra note 20.
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Does the prosecutor have an obligation to ask the judge to stop
the unequal treatment of the attorneys, even if he or she does not
initiate it? The prosecution actually may have its own reasons for
wanting the behavior to stop. The prosecutor may be concerned that
the jury will notice it and side with the defense lawyer, who they
perceive is being treated unfairly or bullied. But short of this, must
the prosecutor take corrective measures? Or would it be acceptable
under the Proposed Standards for the prosecutor to acquiesce
passively?
The revision directs a prosecutor to "strive to preserve the
appearance as well as the reality" of a proper relationship. This
exhortation may not go far enough to prevent the kinds of casual and
even inadvertent behaviors occurring in the typical institutional
setting of a criminal court where a prosecutor may appear daily
before a particular judge and thus develop a relationship susceptible
to informal contacts. Perhaps inclusion of defense attorneys in the
kinds of routine matters that often slip into ex parte contacts is one
way to redress this concern. But the language of the Proposed
Standards should be clearer and unequivocal if it intends to deter
such conduct.
While undoubtedly true that the revision is aimed at impropriety
that may be created by the prosecutor, the prosecutor's role should
include remedial measures to prevent that appearance even if s/he is
not directly responsible for creating it. The prosecutor is in a position
to fix judicial behavior that implicates the public's perception of the
criminal justice system and whose impact may go beyond an
individual case.
2. More Limited Ex Parte Communication
The general admonition to avoid unauthorized ex parte
discussions in individual cases remains unchanged: ex parte
discussions relating to a specific case are prohibited, even about
administrative matters such as scheduling. A new obligation has been
added with regard to ex parte discussion of generalized matters (for
example about case management or administrative matters). A
prosecutor is now directed to "seek to invite some defense counsel to
join in discussion of such issues to the extent practicable."
It would appear that the intent here is to include defense counsel
as a collaborator in the resolution of systemic issues that traditionally
have been addressed by the court and prosecutor ex parte, thus
ensuring a more efficient and less adversarial practice. It probably
contemplates the very reasonable possibility that inviting defense
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input would reduce adversarial hostility and might improve the
policy, assist in its implementation, and assure greater buy-in and less
resistance that could impair the efficiency of the system. But is the
prosecutor required to inform the defense about these policies and to
discuss their impact on the criminal justice process? Probably not,
since the language of the Proposed Standard is aspirational only
("should seek to invite"). But one certainly could argue that it is
"practicable" to discuss these issues with the institutional defenders
to see if there are any consequences that the prosecutor has not
considered that should be taken into account before implementing
the policy. The revision does not require that defense counsel agree
to the policy, or take part in formulating it, but only that it be
discussed. For instance, changes in prosecutorial policies that will
impact individual defendants-such as staffing, planned crime
sweeps, or guilty-plea policies, about which the court would be
informed-now should probably be discussed with a defense
representative present as well.
C. The Prosecutor's Relationship with Defense Counsel
New dimensions of a prosecutor's function appear in Proposed
Standard 3-1.2: the prosecutor as problem solver and reformer.
These new functions dovetail with one version of Proposed Standard
3-3.3 that calls for cooperative problem-solving with the defense in
solving issues both in individual cases and throughout the criminal
justice system.
Institutionally, prosecutors and defense attorneys have had an
uneasy relationship.54 Over the years, the Model Rules, internal
prosecutorial directives, and the Standards have all been amended to
address and resolve some of the more heated issues." Moreover, as
far as individual cases are concerned, prosecutors and defense lawyers
alike probably must concede that a good (or bad) working
relationship can have a substantial impact on the quality of justice,
both perceived and actually achieved.
To some extent, the more explicit the Proposed Standards can be
in addressing and mitigating this problem, the more instrumental they
54. See, e.g., Nancy J. Moore, Intra-Professional Warfare Between Prosecutors and
Defense Attorneys: A Plea for an End to the Current Hostilities, 53 U. PITr. L. REV. 489
(1992).
55. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 2, at R. 3.8(e) (limitations on prosecutorial
subpoenas of lawyers); Id. at R. 4.2 (limiting communication with person represented by
counsel).
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can be. To the extent that the standards endorse values of honesty
and civility they provide a clear message for prosecutors that can be
incorporated into training, continuing education, and ongoing
supervision. While most prosecutors officially endorse civility, and
most lawyers benefit from a reputation for integrity, fair play and
honesty, the task of assuring that these values are upheld may depend
on internal oversight of daily decisions, a task that may be quite
difficult in large offices on either side.
1. Improved Civility and Communication
First, and most simply, the Proposed Standards urge improved
communication between prosecution and defense counsel concerning
issues ranging from the lofty (ethics) to the mundane (scheduling) on
individual cases. The language describing the hoped-for nature of the
working relationship has been changed from "good relations" to the
more specific and affirmative "courteous and collegial," possibly
because the former did not provide sufficient guidance about this
more cooperative dimension." Surely, anyone aware of a recent
incident in which a defense attorney allegedly assaulted a prosecutor
over a scheduling issue would agree that this behavior was
inappropriate." And that lawyer really did not need ethical standards
to know that his conduct was uncivil and wrong (and probably
criminal). Yet, the defense attorney apparently was responding to the
prosecutor's course of conduct-on a mere scheduling issue-that he
experienced as humiliating." Although extreme, the incident
demonstrates the capacity for deterioration of professional
relationships between counsel and the dramatic consequences caused
by the strains placed on the lawyers in the criminal justice system.
The impetus for the revision's call for a more effective and
collegial relationship between prosecutors and defense attorneys also
reflects the gathering momentum of the movement that has resulted
in civility standards in many jurisdictions." Members of the bench
56. PROPOSED PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 20, § 3-3.3(d). Little, App.:
Proposed Prosecution Standards, supra note 20.
57. See Associated Press, supra note 1.
58. Public Defender Choked Prosecutor in Court Hallway, Police Say. ABA J., June
3,2010.
59. See, e.g., NYS STANDARDS OF CIVILITY (Oct. 2007), N.Y. Ct. Rules §§ 130-1 and
1200, App. A; see also ABA Center for Professionalism, Professionalism Codes, available
at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/professionalism/profcodes.html (last visited July 7, 2010)
(listing civility codes, rules and guidelines throughout the U.S.); Jonathon Lerner, Putting
the "Civil" Back in Civil Litigation, NYSBA J. 33 (Mar./Apr. 2009).
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and bar are exasperated with gamesmanship and the time it wastes,
and are concerned that such conduct deleteriously affects public
confidence in the legal system, harms defendants (or parties in
general), and creates an appearance of impropriety and unfairness, or
all of these. Certainly, lack of cooperation between lawyers can
impact the actual fairness and accuracy of a proceeding, not just its
efficiency. Improved communication and collaboration could result
in expediting cases, more effective solutions, and more accurate
results.
While most civility rules or guidelines are largely precatory and
rarely enforced on their own,6 their moral power, and by now,
widespread acceptance, make a difference to the quality of practice.
To date, most civility guidelines relate to civil litigation. The
Proposed Standards take a step toward applying them in the criminal
context.
Scenarios of rudeness and disrespect are played out repeatedly
between prosecutors and defense lawyers, with fault on both sides.
Yet, because the prosecutor has a special position, the incivility and
uncooperative behavior of the prosecutor has an increased potential
to compromise the fairness of the proceeding, harden the positions of
the adversaries, or simply cause unacceptable inconvenience. If the
defendant is detained, his detention might be extended for no
legitimate reason. Time will be wasted. Materials may not be
received in time to be used effectively. If repeated often enough,
such conduct may require the attention of the court in order to set the
system on proper course. On the other hand, prosecutors are busy,
and they must establish priorities with respect to their cases. It may
simply be impossible to accommodate defense counsel's requests in
all cases. Unintentional incivility may be excusable until it becomes
habit. Intentional incivility-for a tactical advantage-however,
would probably violate the rule. Arguably the behavior might be
treated differently if the tactic is designed to cause direct harm to the
60. One author claims that a review of case law in the Seventh Circuit where civility
Standards have been in effect since 1991 revealed no examples when a judge used the
Standards to interfere with zealous advocacy (one objection to such rules) or when a
litigant used the civility standards as the basis for a sanction (another objection that rules
will give rise to collateral litigation or malpractice suits). Hon. Marvin E. Aspen, A
Response to Civility Naysayers, 28 STET. L. REv. 253, 258, 263 (1998). Sometimes a judge
will refer to civility rules when admonishing a lawyer. More serious infractions are
remediable through other sanctions directly related to the case (e.g., costs or contempt) or
attorney discipline under the appropriate code or rules.
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defense or is simply a strategy to intimidate or inconvenience the
defense and thereby increase the greater power of the prosecutor.
2. More Extensive Collaboration
The revision requires that the prosecutor "cooperate" with
defense counsel and the court "in developing solutions to address
ethical, scheduling, or other issues that may arise in particular cases
or generally in the criminal justice system." It is reasonable to
assume that this section addresses a wide range of potential issues,
extending far beyond the ex parte communications covered in
subsection (b), but the drafters have given very little guidance about
the scope of this admonition.
The current version of this Proposed Standard exhorts the
prosecutor to "develop good working relationships with defense
counsel in order to facilitate the resolution of ethical problems."6 1
Obviously, the revision intends to go beyond ethical problems alone.
On what issues should the two sides cooperate? On its face, the
revision may be aimed at requiring collaboration in the types of
circumstances where the prosecutor's virtually unreviewable
discretion and monopoly on the facts puts it in a position to protect a
fair and just result. For example, while is no legal requirement that a
prosecutor question grand jurors about publicity at the request of the
defense attorney, this "solution" in a high-publicity case problem
might be appropriate, either in the individual case or as even an
office-wide policy. The same may be said of a decision about how to
deal with substantial claims of actual innocence when they are raised
pre-trial or post-trial.
Some prosecutors might understand cooperation to require
inclusion of the defense bar or the defense perspective when a
particular law enforcement initiative is in the public interest. Indeed,
this vision may reflect a modern reality that does involve consultation
with stakeholders before new and potentially controversial policies
are put into place. By assuring more buy-in, the law enforcement
goals may be achieved more successfully. Alternatively, by listening
to stakeholders with different perspectives, the policies that are
adopted may take those interests into account, again with a higher
probability of a smooth transition. Even though there may already be
examples of increased cooperation between varying parties when
61. PROPOSED PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 20, § 3-2.8. Little, App.:
Proposed Prosecution Standards, supra note 20.
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institutional policies are being considered and put into effect, this
section could benefit from some commentary about its intended
scope of the kinds of issues where cooperation would be helpful and
should be sought.
Absent the revision, there would be no directive to cooperate in
resolving individual or systemic issues. The very general language of
the Proposed Standard, however, does not provide much framework
for figuring out what kinds of issues are susceptible to this
collaborative effort. Suppose, for example, a judge sitting in
arraignments has developed a well-deserved reputation for releasing
defendants on low or no bail. It comes to the attention of a
supervisor at the public defender's office that the assistant district
attorneys in that part are now routinely making excessive bail or
detention requests to compensate for the judge's perceived "cut 'em
loose" attitude. The supervisor attempts to discuss this with his or
her counterpart at the DA's office. Without more guidance, it is quite
likely that prosecutors will balk at this seeing it as an intrusion on
their traditional prerogatives. And without the incentive of an
explicit obligation, cooperation and civility would depend on the
individual prosecutor's personal style and attitude.
A prosecutor's obligation in the face of defense counsel's
deficiencies-running the gamut from mere mistakes to incompetence
to conflicts to constitutional ineffectiveness-is another potential area
for intervention in the interests of justice. This is an extremely
complicated subject. As a minister of justice, a prosecutor arguably
has an obligation to make sure that the adversary system is working.
Thus, some scholars have argued that in the face of defense counsel's
constitutional ineffectiveness, the prosecutor should do something to
restore the adversarial balance. 62 With respect to incompetence that
does not sink to the level of constitutional ineffectiveness, must a
prosecutor report a lawyer who violates the duty of competence?63
62. See, e.g., Vanessa Merton, What Do You Do When You Meet a "Walking
Violation of the Sixth Amendment" if You're Trying to Put that Lawyer's Client in Jail?, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 997 (2000) (analysis of the obligation to act in the face of attorney
ineffectiveness or incompetence); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of
Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45 (1991);
Ann Poulin, Conflicts of Interest in Criminal Cases: Should the Prosecution Have a Duty to
Disclose?, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1135 (2010); Bruce A. Green, Her Brother's Keeper: The
Prosecutor's Responsibility when Defense Counsel Has a Potential Conflict of Interest, 16
AM. J. CRIM. L. 323 (1989) (duty in the face of defense counsel's potential conflict of
interest).
63. MODEL RULES, supra note 2, at R. 8.3(a).
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Would a prosecutor have the duty to inform opposing counsel of a
potentially favorable argument that the attorney has missed
completely or of a pre-trial notice requirement that is about to be
missed resulting in preclusion of the defendant's proof? Would a
prosecutor have to expose a defense counsel's conflict of interest?
The potential impact of each of these issues on the integrity of the
proceedings is clear. For example, particularly as to conflicts of
interest, about which the defendant may be unaware, if the issue is
raised pretrial, the judge must resolve it or risk reversal.' If it is not
raised until after trial, the defendant will be required to carry the
much more difficult burden of demonstrating prejudice.
Since most cases result in guilty pleas, there is a risk that the
defendant might plead guilty with the advice of a conflicted lawyer.
The courts and rules have clearly placed the resolution of such a
potential conflict in the hands of the trial judges.' If that is the case,
does the prosecutor have an obligation to reveal a potential defense
conflict when defense counsel does not do so? Should the obligation
be different if the conflict arises from an interest in employment, from
the existence of criminal charges brought against defense counsel, or
from an investigation of defense counsel of which s/he is totally
unaware? Does the timing of the investigation matter? Presumably,
a conflict of which the defense lawyer is unaware is less likely to
compromise the proceedings and, at the same time, warrants greater
prosecutorial secrecy. On the other hand, a pending application for
employment or an existing criminal charge create very real dangers of
a prejudicial conflict of interest, and little need for prosecutorial
secrecy. Perhaps the Proposed Standards should be different. If the
prosecutor does have an obligation to disclose or reveal a serious
incompetency or conflict, how should that disclosure be
accomplished? Should the prosecutor deal directly with the defense
attorney? Pursuant to the anti-contact rule, the prosecutor cannot
discuss these issues with the represented defendant so perhaps
disclosure should be made to the court. Should the prosecutor give
defense counsel a chance to resolve the problem with the client first?
This series of questions and the underlying recurring issues they
64. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
65. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
66. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475; FED. R. CRIM. P. 44.
67. MODEL RULES, supra note 2, at R. 4.2.
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present would be well-served with extensive commentary if the
Proposed Standards are to have any meaningful impact.
Intervention by a judge might seem more appropriate in these
circumstances, but too often, particularly in federal criminal cases, the
judge is the least knowledgeable person involved, and thus may be
reluctant to intercede. The job of preventing a train wreck might well
be best delegated to a prosecutor whose own interests in the finality
of a conviction would be well-served by intervention in the event that
merely promoting the interests of justice was insufficient justification
for action.
D. The Defense Function
The revisions to the proposed Defense Standards are still
underway so they are considerably less complete than their
prosecution counterparts. It would be premature to comment too
extensively on changes that may not occur, or on hypothetical
revisions that the drafters should or even might be contemplating. At
the moment, the proposed Defense Standards contain far fewer
directives and most are phrased much more generally than their
analogous prosecution sections.
Proposed Standard 4-1.2(e) reminds defense attorneys that
"[d]efense counsel, in common with all members of the bar, is subject
to standards of conduct stated in statutes, rules, decisions of courts,
and codes, canons, or other standards of professional conduct.""
Although prosecutors are also members of the bar, and thus subject
to general ethical and legal constraints, their "special" role seems to
require a more extensive and detailed elaboration of their duties.
Basically, the Proposed Standards treat defense counsel in criminal
cases as they would any other lawyer. To the extent that defense
counsel may have any "special" role, Proposed Standard 4-1.2 (a)
sympathetically acknowledges that, "[c]riminal defense counsel have
the delicate task of serving both as officers of the court and as loyal
and zealous advocates for their client." 69 Given this duality, the great
majority of the duties of defense counsel are circumscribed by the
68. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-1.2(e) (Proposed
Revisions 2010) [hereinafter PROPOSED DEFENSE STANDARDS]; Rory K. Little, The Role
of Reporter for a Law Project, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 747 (Appendix: ABA Standards
for Criminal Justice: Proposed Revisions to Standards for the Defense Function) (2011)
[hereinafter Little, App.: Proposed Defense Standards].
69. PROPOSED DEFENSE STANDARDS, § 4-1.2 (a); Little, App.: Proposed Defense
Standards, supra note 68.
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rules governing client confidentiality"o and diligence." All in all, it is
much more difficult to establish systemic or institutional objectives
for the defense given the overriding duty to the client. As such,
cooperation and collaboration, values that seem unquestionably
worthy, may come into conflict with this higher duty.
The difference between prosecutors and defense loyalties is even
more distinctive when the interests of individual clients take priority
over other values, such as vindicating constitutional rights. For
example, a prosecutor, as "seeker of justice" and "servant of the
public interest," could not permit a prosecution or conviction that is
procured through a constitutional violation. A defense attorney, on
the other hand, would not have to seek redress for a constitutional
violation if it conflicts with a client's desire to plead guilty and waive
any challenge.
The Proposed Standards may not adequately address these larger
role issues. It may be that defense counsel are excluded from
consultation or decision-making because their systemic role has been
underappreciated or ill-defined. It may be that the call for greater
collaboration is meant to remedy this situation by explicitly elevating
that perception. If so, it would be helpful in commentary for the
drafters to emphasize that defense counsel serve an important
systemic role both by representing the interests of all defendants and
by representing the individual defendant's right to a fair and just
process.
Briefly, both current and Proposed Standard 4-1.2 emphasize the
defense attorney's supervening duty to the client while including
some obligations to preserve the integrity of the system. Like the
duties demanded by the proposed Prosecution Function Standards,
this Proposed Standard requires truthfulness, disclosure of adverse
legal authority, and participation-and even taking the initiative-in
efforts to reform and improve the criminal justice system.
1. Duty Not to Make False Statements of Fact or Law
As with the prosecution Proposed Standard 3-3.3, the current
version of Standard 4-1.2 (f) has been changed to convert the duty to
refrain from misrepresentation to the court from an "intentionally" to
70. MODEL RULES, supra note 2, at R. 1.6.
71. Id. at R. 1.3.
72. PROPOSED DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 68, § 4-1.2; Little, App.: Proposed
Defense Standards, supra note 68.
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"knowingly" state of mind." And, like the proposed Prosecution
Standard, the new duty of candor is extended beyond the tribunal to
third parties as well as the court.74
2. Disclosure of Adverse Legal Authority
The proposed Defense Standard poses a less demanding burden
of disclosure than its prosecution counterpart in two ways." First, the
prosecution must disclose any authority that is objectively directly
adverse authority in the controlling jurisdiction of which the
prosecutor is aware, whereas the defense attorney only has to disclose
authority that he or she subjectively knows is directly adverse. Thus,
defense counsel may justify a failure to disclose either because s/he
did not know about the authority (a justification also available to the
prosecutor) or if, in his or her opinion, the authority was not directly
adverse. Furthermore, prosecutors have the extra duty to discuss the
adverse authority not just to cite it, presumably to help ensure a just
result. That duty is not imposed on defense counsel.
Providing the court with all available legal information best
preserves the integrity of any legal decision. The subtle difference
between the proposed prosecution and defense Standards may or
may not have been intentional given the language of the Model Rule,
but a strict reading seems to require the defendant to disclose the
authority only if he or she is aware that it actually is adverse. While a
prosecutor might claim lack of actual knowledge of the authority,
defense counsel is seemingly able to claim both lack of knowledge of
the authority, or, even if s/he knows of the authority, lack of
knowledge that it is adverse. There is no reason to differentiate the
scienter requirement as applied to prosecutors and defense counsel.
A trickier problem arises again from the dual, and occasionally
dueling, duties of loyalty to the client and responsibility to the
integrity of the system. Suppose a judge instructed relying on an
73. PROPOSED DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 68, § 4-1.2; Little, App.: Proposed
Defense Standards, supra note 68.
74. The only additional duty imposed on the defense arises not under the standards
but under the Model Rules when an attorney is aware that his or her client has engaged or
intends to engage in criminal or fraudulent conduct. In this instance, defense counsel must
take remedial measures, including possible disclosure to the court. MODEL RULES, supra
note 2, at R. 3.3(a)(1).
75. The construction of the Standard differs slightly from Model Rule 3.3(a)(2) ("A
lawyer shall not knowingly fail to disclose . . .") but the proposed Standard and the Rule
both prohibit the failure to disclose adverse authority only where defense counsel actually
knows of the authority.
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incorrect legal authority that is more favorable to the defense than
the correct authority-and the defense attorney realizes this error?
Does he or she have to duty to tell the judge the law that is more
harmful to the client? The Standard does not address or solve this
conundrum.
3. Efforts to Reform the Criminal Justice System
Standard 4-1.2 (d) is unchanged from its earlier version. This
section comes closest to matching the spirit of Proposed Standard 3-
3.3(d) in supporting a collaborative problem-solving approach to
systemic issues. Interestingly, even under the 1993 Standards, defense
attorneys had been encouraged to engage in these efforts even though
the earlier prosecution Standards did not impose this cooperative
duty on prosecutors. The Proposed Standards send a clear message
that both sides should cooperate to improve and reform the criminal
adversarial system when appropriate.
This ambition may be difficult for defenders to realize, however.
For example, a defense attorney participating in a bar association
project to reform court rules may be working on a rule change that
could have adverse affects on individual clients despite having a
systemic benefit. If this lawyer on that committee feels conflicted or
compromised, and thereby constrained, then the defense perspective
will not have an appreciable effect on the systemic reform. And, if
constrained by too much civility and cooperation, they may fear
compromising their capacity to provide zealous representation by
participating in a solution that, while perhaps beneficial generally,
may harm individual clients. This paradox makes it more difficult for
the defense to play a role in these efforts, but it certainly does not
require that they be excluded from the discussion.
To some extent, making the system more collaborative serves in
a more formal manner to elevate and enlarge the view of the role
defense counsel serve in the criminal process and the respect
accorded to their advocacy responsibilities. But the reality of the
criminal justice system may make it difficult for defense attorneys to
be included on a systemic basis. The fact that defense counsel have
not been invited to the reform table in the past reflects a general
diminution of the value of defense counsel, or, to put it bluntly,
distrust. This divide is observable in the daily lives of defense
counsel. For example, in full view of potential jurors and others,
defense counsel are regularly subjected to shoe removal and brief-
case searches as they enter the courthouses, whereas prosecutors are
waved through. The proposed Defense Standard currently makes no
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mention of civility, courtesy, or collegiality. There is no corollary to
the proposed prosecution Standard 3-3.3, "relationships with the
court, other counsel and third parties," particularly 3-3.3(d)," or to
proposed 3-6.2(a)." Defense Standard 4-7.1 mandates that defense
counsel adhere to codes of professionalism and manifest "a courteous
and professional attitude" toward all of the other courtroom
participants.
Again, the reality of the criminal justice system may explain this
difference. An uncivil defense counsel will not have the same effect
on the system as an uncivil prosecutor, except perhaps to be
perceived as offensive or aggressive and thus damage his or her
reputation. On the other hand, if constrained by too much civility,
defense attorneys may fear compromising their capacity to provide
zealous representation by participating in a solution that, while
perhaps beneficial generally, may harm individual clients.
Conclusion
The proposed revisions represent a substantial step toward a
more reliable, trustworthy, and efficient criminal justice system. The
revisions explicitly recognize the central, powerful, and multi-
dimensional role of the prosecutor and attempt to respond accurately
and realistically to the needs and demands of that role. To the extent
that these changes capture some transformations to the traditional
adversary system, they should be greeted with acceptance and
approval by both prosecutors and defense counsel. To the extent that
they require prosecutors to shoulder even more responsibilities and
to shift candor higher on the list of their priorities, the changed
Standards may seem constraining, idealistic, and unworkable to some
prosecutors. By the same token, if too many compromises are
imposed on defense attorneys at the expense of their mission to
76. "A prosecutor should strive to develop and maintain courteous and collegial
working relationships with judges and defense counsel." PROPOSED PROSECUTION
STANDARDS, supra note 20, § 3-3.3(d); Little, App.: Proposed Prosecution Standards,
supra note 20.
77. "As an officer of the court, the prosecutor should support the authority of the
court and the dignity of the courtroom by adherence to codes of professionalism and
civility, and by manifesting a professional and courteous attitude toward the judge,
opposing counsel, witnesses, defendants, jurors, court staff, and others." PROPOSED
PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 20, § 3-7.2; Little, App.: Proposed Prosecution
Standards, supra note 20.
78. PROPOSED DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 68, § 4-7.1; Little, App.: Proposed
Defense Standards, supra note 68.
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provide undiluted representation to the individual client, the revisions
will require thoughtful balancing. Yet the call for greater
collaboration and civility will undoubtedly lead to a fairer and more
efficient criminal justice system. As a work in progress, the Proposed
Standards have so far made great strides to accomplish important
goals.
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